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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the funds in question are subject forever to the claims of the decedent's unknown
distributees, the state is the only party affected by the Court's decision. Certainly,
between the state and federal governments, the latter has, in light of the federal
statute, a superior claim to the use and benefit of the funds that arose from its
beneficent acts.
Trusfs-Sfock Dividends and Stock Splits for Purposes of Distribution Under
Trust Instrument
In 1918, Wood Fosdick, by deed of trust, created a trust for each of two
nieces. He provided that the income from each trust should be paid to the niece
for her life and upon her death to a grand niece for life, with the remainder to
the settlor if he be living, or to his executor if he be dead. The deed of trust
also provided that any and all stock dividends received by the trusts should be
turned over to the settlor if he be living, or to his executor if he be dead. The
dividends were to be free and dear of all trusts. The settlor has since died and
the sole residuary legatee of his estate is the American Museum of Natural
History, which, as such, has succeeded to the settlor's interest in stock dividends
declared upon stock held by the trusts.
Common stock, issued by General Electric, was included in the stock held by
the trusts. In 1954 that corporation wished t6 reduce the market value of its
stock, and to establish a low par value for each share of stock in order to facilitate
more frequent and less expensive transfer of its stock.43 To accomplish these ends
the stockholders authorized the corporation to change its thirty-five million
no-par shares into one hundred and five million five dollar par value common
shares. This necessitated a transfer of earned surplus to capital, which more than
doubled the capital account, in order to bring the total capital account up to the
new total par value of the outstanding shares.44 The question presented to the
Court in In re Fosdick45 was whether this transaction constituted a stock divi-
dend.
When a corporation capitalizes retained surplus available for dividends instead
of distributing it, a stock dividend results. 46 The transfer from surplus to capital
43. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §4321; Treas. Reg. 71 §113.32 (1941). The trans-
fer tax on a sale of no par stock is at the rate of $.05 a share if the sale price
is less than $20 per share and $.06 a share if the sale price is more than $20
per share. The transfer tax on a sale of par value stock is at the rate of $.05
per aggregate $100 of par value when the sale is at the rate of less than $20
per share and at the rate of $.06 per aggregate of $100 of par value when the
sale is at the rate of more than $20 per share.
44. N. Y. STOCK CORPORATION LAV §38.
45. 4 N.Y.2d 646, 176 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1958).
46. Eisner v. Macomber, 252-U.S. 189, 211 (1920).
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is the test of a stock dividend in New York47 as well as in other jurisdictions. 48
On the other hand a stock split is said to take place when the articles of incorpo-
ration are amended to provide that the existing shares of stock be divided into
additional share units, without transfering surplus to capital.49 This distinction
is clouded when the division of existing shares is accompanied by a simultaneous
or proximate transfer of surplus to capital 50 It is this situation that faced the
Court in the present case.
The Court held that that proportion of new stock representing a transfer
of earned surplus to capital constituted a dividend. That amount of the stock held
by the trusts which represented the transfer of surplus to capital was therefore
awarded to the residuary legatee of the estate of the settlor. The majority,
notwithstanding the unusually large amount, both quantitatively and relatively,
of surplus transferred to capital, refused to modify the New York rule and
concluded that this was a stock dividend according to the settled law of the
jurisdiction. It also pointed out that while the test used in New York might not
comply with that accepted in the financial world5' it was not within the province
of the Court to .alter a definition upon which testators and setdors have relied
for many years.
The dissent felt that the Court was unduly formalistic and unrealistic in
denominating this corporate action a stock dividend, pointing out that the
transaction was received by the financial world52 as a stock split and that it
failed to meet the accepted accounting test for a stock dividend.53 The dissent
47. 4 WHITE, NEW YORK CORPORATIONS 34, 35 (12th ed. 1948); Equitable
Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N.Y. 1, 164 N.E. 723 (1928)..
48. Soles v. Granger 174 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1949) criticized in BALLANTIN9,
LATTEN, AND JENNINGS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 786 (2d ed. 1953);
In re Rees Estate, 210 Oreg. 429, 311 P.2d 438 (1957). Both of these cases in-
volved a division of authorized shares of stock accompanied by a transfer from
surplus to capital. See 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §5362.1 (perm.
ed. rev. 1957).
49. BALLANTINE, LATTEN, AND JENNINGS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-
TIONS 785 (2d ed. 1953).
50. In re Strong, 198 Misc. 7, 96 N.Y.S.2d 75. aff'd mem. 277 App.Div. 1155,
101 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (1950).
51. New York Times, Feb. 27, 1954, p. 20 col. 2; id. Apr. 21, 1954 p. 45, col.
6; Moody Industrial Manual 2805 (1957).
52. Ibid.
53. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 43, The American Institute of
Accountants. The purpose of a stock dividend is to give the shareholders some
separate evidence of their interest in the accumulated corporate earnings with-
out a distribution of cash or other corporate assets. The purpose of a stock
split-up is to increase the number of outstanding shares so as to effect a re-
duction in the market price and thereby obtain improved marketability of the
shares. Therefore, where the number of additional shares issued is so great
that it may reasonably be expected to have the effect of materially reducing
the per share market value, the transaction clearly partakes of the nature of a
stock split-up. Generally an issuance of more than 20 to 25 percent of the num-
ber of shares previously outstanding will materially affect market value and
therefore should be classified as a stock split-up.
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further reasoned that it was improbable that this result was intended by the
settlor.
WX'ile the result in this case reduced the income of the income beneficiaries
because of the provision in the trust instrument allocating stock dividends to the
estate of the settlor, the opeiation of the rule of this case in the ordinary trust
will cause shares issued in this manner to go to principal.54 Therefore, in general,
this case effects no substantial harm "o the beneficiaries of a trust agreement,
while following the established law of this state.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Separation Agreements--Breach of Covenant Not to Molest
In Borax v. Borax,' the plaintiff-wife and defendant-husband had a separation
agreement containing a covenant that "neither party shall, in any manner or
form whatever, molest or trouble the other." It is alleged that the defendant
breached this covenant by obtaining a Mexican divorce without jurisdiction,
purporting to marry another woman, and giving his name to her child. Based
on this alleged breach, the plaintiff brought an action to set aside the existing
separation and another action for separation on grounds of adultery or on the
grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment.
The Special Term, holding that no molestation was established, dismissed
the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action.2 The Appellate Division3 assumed molestationbut held that the
"molestation clause" was an independent covenant and a breach of this clause was
not a rescission of the separation agreement.4 Their judgment was, therefore, for
afflirmance, because an existing separation agreement containing a valid and
subsisting provision for support and maintenance is a bar to a subsequent
action for separatiori.5
Historically, the "molestation clause" was used exclusively to prevent a
separated spouse from compelling the restoration of conjugal rights. As the law
favors resumption of marital relations, such clauses were of doubtful validity and,
54. N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §17-a states that unless otherwise pro-
vided for all stock dividends go to principal. (Effective as to instruments exe-
cuted after effective date of statute.)
1. 4 N.Y.2d 113, 172 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1958).
2. N. Y. R. Civ. PRAc. 106, subd. 4.
3. Borax v. Borax, 3 A.D.2d 404, 161 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1st Dep't 1957).
4. Fearon v. Aylesford, 14 Q.B.D. 792 (1884).
5. Drane v. Drane, 207 App. Div. 217, 201 N.Y.Supp. 756 (1st Dep't 1923).
